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The large majority of elections in the post-Soviet area, by some accounts the most
authoritarian region in the world, are marred by large-scale electoral malpractice. Since
the late 1990s, the ﬁnal reports from OSCE election observation missions include
numerical data on the quality of election-day procedures as judged by election observers.
With these data it is possible to study trends and patterns in the prevalence of electoral
malpractice in the post-Soviet area. This study accordingly explores the relationship
between electoral malpractice and three variables: the type of elections (presidential or
parliamentary), the presence of electoral competition (present in competitive elections,
absent in hegemonic elections), and the advance of time. The ﬁndings suggest that elec-
toral malpractice does not signiﬁcantly decrease over time, is as widespread in parlia-
mentary as in presidential elections, but, in line with expectations, is more severe in
hegemonic elections than in competitive elections. These ﬁndings contribute to insights
about the nature of authoritarian elections and are important for considerations about the
future of election observation in the region.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Over the past decade democracy has suffered a more
signiﬁcant setback in the post-Soviet area (outside the
Baltic states), than in any other region in the world
(Puddington, 2010; p. 140). Whereas there were great
expectations for democratization in the early 1990s, the
post-Soviet area at the end of the 2000s counted as the
most authoritarian region worldwide next to the Middle
East and North Africa (Swedberg & Sprout, 2008). The pooren/wiss_mitarbeiter/
-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hanystate, or absence of democracy in the post-Soviet area is
witnessed in the conduct of elections: until 2010, nine
countries in the region – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan – had not organized a single election that
did not draw signiﬁcant criticism from the Organizations
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since that
organization started observing and monitoring elections in
the 1990s. A tenth country – Russia – received a more
favorable assessment for its elections until 2003 but has
since been seen as consolidating authoritarian rule
(Shevtsova, 2007). The regimes of these countries for most
of the 2000s could be divided into three types: competitive
authoritarian regimes in Armenia and Georgia that
featured real political competition but a consistently
uneven playing ﬁeld in favor of pro-regime forces; hege-
monic authoritarian regimes in Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian, and Tajikistan that orga-
nized uncompetitive elections in which large victories forangUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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part of the opposition could participate and sometimes
even win some seats; and political closed authoritarianism
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan under which true oppo-
sition is outlawed, let alone can compete in elections.1 This
classiﬁcation corresponds with the scores for the ‘Electoral
Process’ component in Freedom House’s Nations in Transit
annual comparative study of democratic development in
the post-communist world. On a scale between 1 (most
democratic) and 7 (least democratic), Georgia and Armenia
scored 5.25 and 5.75 respectively in 2010. Tajikistan scored
6.50, and the other ﬁve hegemonic authoritarian regimes
6.75. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, ﬁnally, were at 7.00,
conﬁrming the politically closed nature of their political
systems.2 The two remaining states in the region, Moldova
and Ukraine, have held at least one election that was not
only competitive, but that also took place in a reasonably
level playing ﬁeld. At other times, however, incumbent
forces in these countries did create a clear electoral
advantage to their beneﬁt.
As participating states of the OSCE, the undemocratic
states of the post-Soviet area have an obligation to invite
OSCE observer missions. In response to these invitations,
almost everynational electionhas beenvisited in nine of the
twelve post-Soviet countries by election observation
missions, each with at least one hundred, and in most cases
several hundred observers. Large missions are no longer
dispatched to Russia starting from 2007, while elections
have been observed only by expert teams in Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. Around the elections they observe, the
OSCE missions publish a series of interim reports, a prelim-
inary statement one day after the elections, and a ﬁnal
report, some two months after each election. The reports
contain awealth of information about electoral malpractice
in everyelection. Electoralmalpractice is understoodhereas
any type of violation of the fundamental principles of free
and fair elections.3 Among different forms of electoral
malpractice, a distinction can be made between deliberate
efforts to inﬂuence the outcome of elections, and uninten-
tional violations of standards that can generally be ascribed
to a lack of professionalism (López-Pintor, 2010, p. 8). Given
that the reports from OSCE election observation missions
have been consistently issued over the course of typically
four to seven national elections per country, it is possible to
study trends and patterns in the conduct of elections in the
undemocratic states.
The ﬁnal reports from observation missions to thirty-
nine undemocratic elections since the late 1990s contain
ﬁgures on the share of observers who assessed voting and
counting procedures negatively or positively.4 Using these1 These three regime types are derived from the regime classiﬁcation
presented by Larry Diamond (2002); see also Howard and Roessler
(2006).
2 The Nation in Transit reports can be consulted at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page¼17.
3 This understanding of electoral malpractice is similar to that of Donno
(2010). Schedler (2002) provides an overview of the fundamental prin-
ciples of free and fair elections.
4 Reports from OSCE election observation missions can be consulted at:
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections.simple numerical data, this article studies the relation
between the extent of electoral malpractice and three
variables: the type of elections (presidential or parlia-
mentary), the presence of electoral competition (present in
competitive elections, absent in hegemonic elections), and
the advance of time. The ﬁndings contribute to insights
regarding undemocratic elections and have implications
for the practice of election observation in an undemocratic
context. This article ﬁrst, in the next section, introduces
a dataset regarding electoral malpractice in the post-Soviet
area. The following three sections employ these data to
explore the relation between the extent of electoral
malpractice and the three variables outlined above. The
conclusion discusses the implications of the ﬁndings for the
future of election observation in the post-Soviet area.
2. Undemocratic elections and electoral observation
2.1. Hegemonic and competitive authoritarian elections
The majority of elections in the undemocratic states of
the post-Soviet area feature a gap in vote share between
the winner of elections and the runner-up that is rarely
seen in democracies. In Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, it is common for the regime candidate in presi-
dential elections or the ruling party in parliamentary
elections to get more than ﬁve times the vote share of the
main opposition force or candidate. Some elections in other
countries in the region have equally been characterized by
overwhelming victories for pro-regime forces. Distinctive
about these hegemonic elections is that, unlike in
competitive elections there is no serious doubt about the
outcome prior to the elections: the regime, the opposition,
and the public all anticipate a large victory for regime
forces. Consequently, the period leading up to these hege-
monic elections is often muted and uneventful. In its ﬁnal
report of the 2008 presidential elections in Azerbaijan, for
example, the OSCE noted that ‘the pre-election period was
characterized by the absence of a competitive campaign,
the limited involvement of parties and candidates, and very
low public interest in the campaign’ (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008, p.
12). Similarly illustrative is this comment from the OSCE
ﬁnal report on the 2004 Russian presidential election:
‘Campaigning for the 2004 Presidential Election was
generally very low key. The few campaign events taking
place were organized around visits by some candidates to
the regions; otherwise there was almost no visible
campaign activity beyond what was present in the media’
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2004, p. 12). There are, on the other hand,
also genuinely competitive elections in the undemocratic
countries of the region, albeit held typically under condi-
tions that intentionally beneﬁt regime forces. In these
competitive elections, there is no near-total certainty about
the outcome as in hegemonic elections, and pre-electoral
campaigns consequently witness more intrigue.
The table at the end of this section displays the vote
shares (in some cases seat shares) of thewinner of elections
and those of the main opposition force in the thirty-nine
undemocratic elections for which numerical data on the
quality of election-day procedures are available from OSCE
election observation reports. All these thirty-nine elections
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tional standards by OSCE and were organized by regimes
that at the time of the election were classiﬁed by the
Freedom House Freedom in the World index as ‘partly free’
or ‘not free’.5 For presidential elections, the table contains
the vote shares of regime candidates against those of the
main candidate oppositional candidate. For parliamentary
elections in which at least part of the available seats in the
legislature were elected through proportional representa-
tion via party-lists, the vote shares are those of the main
pro-regime party and the main opposition party in the
proportional section of the vote. For the Azeri parliamen-
tary elections of 2005 and 2010, in which all deputies were
elected from single-member districts, the seat shares of the
ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party and themain opposition party
are displayed. As the table indicates, no opposition candi-
dates representing political parties won mandates in the
2010 election (Bəylərqızı, 2010). The numbers for the
Belarusian parliamentary elections ﬁnally present the seat
shares of legislators who are supportive of the regime
against the seat shares of opposition politicians. Parlia-
mentary elections in Belarus are exceptional in that, largely
due to the absence of amajor pro-regime party, only a small
minority of elected legislators represent political parties
(White & Korosteleva-Polglase, 2006, p. 158; Glod, 2008).
The table codes the thirty-nine elections in the table as
either hegemonic or competitive. A precise cut-off point
between a hegemonic election and a competitive election is
difﬁcult to establish. Regarding the table presented in this
section, the election with the smallest ratio (4.9 times)
between the vote share of the regime force and that of the
main opposition force that has been coded as hegemonic is
the 2001 presidential election in Belarus. It is widely
acknowledged that Lukashenka’s regime since 1996 has
been hegemonic rather than competitive authoritarian,
with virtually no opportunity for the opposition to chal-
lenges the regime’s rule.6 On the other hand, the election
with the biggest ratio (3.8 times) between the vote share of
the regime force and that of the main opposition force that
has been coded as competitive is the April 2009 election in
Moldova that took place in a signiﬁcantly more competitive
political environment (OSCE/ODIHR, 2009).2.2. Electoral malpractice
The second piece of information in the table below
concerns assessments by OSCE election observers of the
quality of voting and counting procedures during the
undemocratic elections in the post-Soviet area that have
been observed by ‘full’ observation missions, mostly over
the course of the 2000s. The principal objective of OSCE
election observation missions is to assess the ﬁt between
the conduct of elections and international standards for the
conduct of elections. The key benchmark in this regard is
the 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the5 Reports from the Freedom House Freedom in the World index can be
consulted at: http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page¼15.
6 See Freedom House Nations in Transit reports for Belarus at: http://
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page¼17.Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE
(Copenhagen Document) that lists criteria for free elec-
tions, and to which all OSCE participating states are
formally committed. OSCE’s election observation can be
considered a form of electoral assistance as it ultimately
seeks to contribute to an improvement of the quality of
elections. The other type of electoral assistance that the
OSCE is involved in, often in conjunction with the Venice
Commission of the Council of Europe, are reviews of elec-
toral legislation, coupled with concrete recommendations
on how to improve legislation and bring it into line with
international standards.
The Copenhagen Document established the norm that
OSCE participating states invite observers to their elections.
Among the post-Soviet states, ‘full’ missions have never
been dispatched only to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
because, according to the OSCE, the conditions for the
conduct of credible elections in these countries were too
obviously lacking (Fawn, 2006, pp. 1137–8). The parlia-
mentary and presidential elections in Russia in 2007 and
2008 respectively were equally observed by limited rather
than ‘full’ missions, in this case because the Russian
authorities refused to follow procedures that are usually
followed when a mission is invited (Peuch, 2007). Full
observer missions consist of a core team located in the
capital, a few dozen long-term observers in the regions
who arrive weeks before the elections and leave within
a few weeks after the elections, and short-term observers,
between one hundred and a thousand in number, whose
work is focused on election day.
Around the elections, the missions issue a number of
reports on the course of the election process. The most
noted of the mission’s publications is a preliminary state-
ment that is presented during a press conference, typically
with members of the European Parliament and the Parlia-
mentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the OSCE,
on the day following the elections. At these press confer-
ences and in the preliminary statements, the observer
missions choose a formulation to qualify the compliance of
the election with international standards that is widely
reported by national and international media and therefore
is of signiﬁcant political importance. The most informative
of the mission’s publications, however, is the ﬁnal report,
which is published around two months after election-day
and which covers all stages of the electoral process. Start-
ing from the late the 1990s most of the ﬁnal reports, and
often the preliminary statements as well, contain ﬁgures on
the share of short-term observers who have positively or
negatively assessed counting and voting procedures.
Because these ﬁgures have been continuously reported
since, is it possible to use these data for comparative
analysis.
While the ﬁgures provide clues about the incidence of
election-day irregularities, electoral malpractice can of
course affect every stage of an electoral process. Apart from
election day, important stages in the electoral process that
can be manipulated include the drafting and amending of
legislation, the registration of candidates, the drawing of
district boundaries, the composition of election commis-
sions, media reporting, and the handling of complaints and
appeals. The ﬁnal reports from OSCE elections observation
7 For a detailed explanation of this logic, see Vorobyov, 2010.
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stages, but the only constant non-descriptive data are the
ﬁgures on election-day irregularities.
Speciﬁcally, these ﬁgures present the percentage of
observers that have replied ‘very good’ or ‘good’ – rather
than ‘very bad’ and ‘bad’ – on their observation report
forms in response to questions about the quality of voting
and counting procedures. The table below displays the
percentages for all thirty-nine undemocratic elections in
the region since 1998 for which these percentages were
reported in the ﬁnal reports of OSCE election observation
missions. In case a second round was held in elections, only
the percentages from the ﬁrst round are displayed. Voting
procedures are typically observed in ﬁve to ﬁfteen polling
stations per observer team, while counting is only observed
in one polling station per team. The number of observations
that the percentages of positive assessments of counting
procedures reﬂect, therefore, is the total number of short-
term observers divided by two, while the number of
observations regarding voting procedures is many times
bigger, often amounting to thousands of individual obser-
vations Table 1.
In addition to the mere percentage of observers who
positively or negativelyassessed voting andcounting results,
the ﬁnal reports of observation missions also provide infor-
mation about the irregularities that were most frequently
observed during voting and counting, and that lead to
a negative assessment by observers. Regarding voting
procedures, the most common irregularities, according to
the reports, include the presence in polling stations of
unauthorized persons, multiple voting – individuals being
given the opportunity to vote more than once – and ballot
stufﬁng. Other irregularities that the ﬁnal reports often
mention are group voting and open voting, which both
violate the principle of secrecy of the vote, and proxy voting,
whereby a person (unlawfully) votes on behalf of someone
else. Among the irregularities that are most often observed
during the vote count are, again, the presence of unautho-
rized persons, tampering with results protocols – the
changing of ﬁgures on those protocols – and the failure to
publish the results at the polling station immediately after
the count as well as the refusal to distribute copies of the
result protocols to observers. While some irregularities that
are noted on electionday byobserversmay result froma lack
of professionalism on the part of members of election
commissions, most irregularities mentioned by the OSCE
reports point to deliberate efforts to corrupt the election
process. The following three sections look into the relation
between the incidenceof these irregularitieson theonehand
and the advance of time, type of elections, and presence of
electoral competition on the other hand.
3. Does electoral malpractice decrease over time?
Does electoral malpractice decrease over time? Do
authoritarian regimes become more adept at masking the
manipulation of elections? Or are they unconcerned about
the visibility of the manipulation and corrupt the electoral
process on election day as much as before or even more?
There are contrasting assumptions on the relationship
between the advance of time and the degree of electoralmalpractice. A simple reason to believe that electoral
malpractice should have increased in the post-Soviet area is
that, according to inﬂuential democracy indices, most of
the ten states that were continuously undemocratic during
the 2000s have become more authoritarian over the
decade. FreedomHouse’s Nations in Transit annual study of
democratic development in the post-communist world also
ﬁnds that the quality of the electoral process speciﬁcally
has deteriorated over the past decade in all ten states,
except for Turkmenistan, where it could not drop any
lower, and Belarus, where it remained at 6.75 out of 7.00. A
common sense assumption is that the degree of electoral
malpractice goes up when electoral competition declines.
An increase in overall electoral manipulation has indeed
been documented with respect to elections in Russia
(Treisman, 2009). Little if any solid evidence that would
point to a similar increase in electoral malpractice in the
other countries of the region that were persistently
undemocratic during the 2000s, however, is unavailable.
The expectation of the increase of electoral malpractice
over time in authoritarian states corresponds with a logic
according to which undemocratic leaders increasingly
grow conﬁdent that committing fraud will not be met with
popular revolt.7 Undemocratic leaders may initially fear the
popular resistance against their regime that committing
fraud can entail. Learning from previous experiences,
however, undemocratic leaders gradually become more
aware that committing fraud, or certain types of fraud, do
not trigger a threatening degree of opposition, and the
incentive to commit fraud consequently becomes stronger.
There are, however, also reasons to believe that electoral
malpractice over time will decrease. The argument that
electoral malpractice is likely to decrease with the advance
of time appears to be corroborated by the OSCE election
observation reports, which almost invariably mention
some form of progress that has been made by election-
holding countries compared to previous elections. More-
over, observation reports of recent years are seemingly less
damning than earlier reports in their assessments about
the elections, although this may be primarily a matter of
choosing different formulations. While some ten years ago
it was common for the OSCE to state in its observation
reports that elections plain and simple did not meet
international standards, this type of formulation has been
replaced by slightly more upbeat statements. About the
2001 presidential election in Belarus, for instance, the OSCE
ﬁnal report of the observation mission noted that the
‘election process failed to meet the OSCE commitments for
democratic elections formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen
Document and the Council of Europe standards’ and that
among the ﬂaws of the electoral process was ‘[a] political
regime that is not accustomed to and does everything in its
power to block the opposition’ (OSCE/ODIHR, 2001b, pp. 2–
3). The ﬁnal report for the 2010 presidential elections that
were widely condemned, on the other hand, notes that the
‘presidential election indicated that Belarus has a consid-
erable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments for
democratic elections’ (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011b, p. 1). Similarly,
Table 1
Malpractice in undemocratic elections in the post-Soviet area, 1998–2010.
Country
and year
Type of
elections
Vote/seat share of
pro-regime candidate
or main pro-regime
party
Vote/seat or seat share
of opposition candidates
or main opposition
candidate
Hegemonic or
competitive
elections
Percentage of polling
stations where voting
procedures are
positively assessed
Percentage of polling
stations where counting
procedures are
positively assessed
Armenia 1998 presidential 38.5 30.4 competitive 84 75
Armenia 1999 parliamentary 41.5 12.0 competitive 87 78
Armenia 2003 presidential 49.5 28.2 competitive 90 80
Armenia 2003 parliamentary 23.5 11.4 competitive 90 67
Armenia 2007 parliamentary 33.9 13.2 competitive 94 83
Armenia 2008 presidential 52.8 21.5 competitive 95 84
Azerbaijan 2000 parliamentary 62.3 11.0 hegemonic 74 48
Azerbaijan 2003 presidential 76.8 14.0 hegemonic 74 45
Azerbaijan 2005 parliamentary 48.8 4.0 hegemonic 87 59
Azerbaijan 2008 presidential 87.3 2.8 hegemonic 94 77
Azerbaijan 2010 parliamentary 57.6 0.0 hegemonic 89 68
Belarus 2001 presidential 75.6 15.4 hegemonic 69 n.a.
Belarus 2004 parliamentary 100.0 0.0 hegemonic 90 38
Belarus 2006 presidential 82.6 6.0 hegemonic 90 50
Belarus 2008 parliamentary 100.0 0.0 hegemonic 95 52
Belarus 2010 presidential 79.7 2.4 hegemonic 94 54
Georgia 1999 parliamentary 41.9 7.8 hegemonic 79 76
Georgia 2000 presidential 78.8 16.7 hegemonic 84 52
Georgia 2003 parliamentary 21.3 18.1 competitive 81 69
Georgia 2004 presidential 96.0 1.9 hegemonic 76 68
Georgia 2004 parliamentary 67.6 7.6 hegemonic 79 67
Georgia 2008 presidential 53.5 25.7 competitive 92 77
Georgia 2008 parliamentary 59.2 17.7 competitive 92 78
Kyrgyzstan 2000 parliamentary 18.6 27.6 competitive 90 74
Kyrgyzstan 2005 parliamentary n.a.a n.a. competitive 89 89
Kyrgyzstan 2005 presidential 88.9 3.8 hegemonic 93 65
Kyrgyzstan 2007 parliamentary 47.0 5.1 hegemonic 91 67
Kyrgyzstan 2009 presidential 76.1 8.4 hegemonic 89 50
Kazakhstan 2004 parliamentary 60.6 12.0 hegemonic 87 72
Kazakhstan 2005 presidential 91.0 6.6 hegemonic 92 72
Kazakhstan 2007 parliamentary 88.1 4.6 hegemonic 94 61
Moldova 2005 parliamentary 46.0 28.5 competitive 97 78
Moldova 2009b parliamentary 49.5 13.1 competitive 97 91
Russia 2003 parliamentary 37.6 12.6 competitive 95 73
Russia 2004 presidential 71.3 13.7 hegemonic 95 76
Tajikistan 2005 parliamentary 64.5 14.0 hegemonic 80 46
Tajikistan 2006 presidential 79.3 6.2 hegemonic 80 33
Tajikistan 2010 parliamentary 71.0 8.2 hegemonic 74 44
Ukraine 2004 presidential 39.3 39.9 competitive 94 91
a All candidates ran as independents. The partisan afﬁliation of many candidates, if any, was not clear. See Abazov, 2005.
b These are the April 2009 elections rather than the early elections in July 2009.
8 The reports from CIS election observation missions can be consulted
at (in Russian) http://www.iacis.ru/html/?id¼124.
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Azerbaijan, the OSCE found that ‘the overall process fell
short of international standards for democratic elections’
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2001a, p. 1), the verdict on the 2010 parlia-
mentary elections was that ‘the conduct of these elections
overall was not sufﬁcient to constitute meaningful progress
in the democratic development of the country’ (OSCE/
ODIHR, 2011a, p. 1).
Another reason why it could be expected that electoral
malpractice will decrease over time is that the undemo-
cratic regimes of the region are interested in international
recognition. Taking the step of holding an election that is
more credible and of better quality than previous elections
could help to improve the international standing of
a regime. It is not obvious, however, that the regimes are
strongly concerned about their reputations, let alone that
they would be ready to counteract electoral malpractice in
order to improve their reputations. By effectively banning
OSCE election observation since 2007, Russia has gone the
furthest in demonstrating its lack of regard for the election-related activities of the OSCE. Within the framework of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and typically
at the instigation of Russia, the undemocratic states of the
region have also collectively criticized the practice of OSCE
election observation. The CIS member states have repeat-
edly proposed to reduce the OSCE’s ‘human dimension’,
under which election-related activities fall, at the beneﬁt of
strengthening the security dimension (Tomiuc, 2004). In
addition, the CIS has stepped up an autonomous election
observation effort parallel to that of the OSCE. Approxi-
mately since the mid-2000s, almost every national election
in the region has been visited by a CIS mission that is
sometimes even bigger in size than the OSCE mission.
Remarkably, CIS election observation missions have lended
a stamp of approval to even the most uncompetitive elec-
tions in the region.8 Also, the CIS and the Parliamentary
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as the 2002 Convention on Standards of Democratic Elec-
tions and Electoral Rights and Freedoms in the CIS Member
States, and the 2008 Declaration on Principals of the
International Observation of Elections and Referendums in
the CIS Member States, that promulgate a shared vision on
democratic elections.9 The CIS vision on democratic elec-
tions on close inspection is considerably less demanding
than the vision that is laid out in the above-mentioned
Copenhagen Document, or the 2002 Code of Good Prac-
tice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. Finally,
with the exception of Armenia, the undemocratic states of
the post-Soviet area routinely disregard recommendations
issued by OSCE, often in conjunction with the Venice
Commission of the Council of Europe, to improve electoral
legislation (Bader, 2011). In sum, there appears to be a lack
of interest among the undemocratic states of the region to
shore up their international reputation through compliance
with international standards regarding elections.
Even if overall electoral malpractice remains on a high
level, there could still be a decrease in the electoral
malpractice that is committed speciﬁcally on election day.
Bealieu and Hyde (2009) argue that in many undemocratic
states electoral malpractice has shifted from relatively
obvious fraud, committed mostly on election day, to less
readily observable ‘strategic manipulation’ at different
stages of the electoral process. While elections in these
authoritarian states remain strictly unfair, the regimes are
less likely to be taken to task for the electoral malpractice as
the malpractice is not committed on election day. In Latin
America, for example, the kind of ‘crude fraud’ that was
commonplace until a few decades ago is said to have been
virtually eliminated while electoral manipulation as such
persists (Hartlyn & McCoy, 2001). Examples of ‘strategic
manipulation’ include the manipulation of electoral legis-
lation to beneﬁt pro-regime forces, intimidation of oppo-
sition candidates, and tampering with voter lists. The
reports from OSCE election observation missions abound
with examples of strategic manipulation. Forms of electoral
manipulation that are mentioned in almost all ﬁnal reports
of OSCE election observation missions of the undemocratic
states of the former Soviet Union are the stafﬁng of election
commission with regime loyalists, bias in media reporting
about the elections, and the use of so-called administrative
resources such as public venues, government ofﬁces, and
the labor of public servants, for the purposes of the election
campaign of pro-regime candidates or parties.
The evidence from the post-Soviet area does not point to
a signiﬁcant trend in the prevalence of election-day regu-
larities in either way: observers positively assessed voting
procedures in elections until 2005 (n ¼ 18) in 84 percent of
observations against 90 percent of observations for elections
since 2005 (n ¼ 21). With regard to the assessment of
counting procedures, however, the image is reversed:9 The Convention on Standards of Democratic Elections and Electoral
Rights and Freedoms in the CIS Member States can be found at http://
www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id¼616; The Declaration on Principals of
the International Observation of Elections and Referendums in the CIS
Member States can be found at http://www.iacis.ru/html/?id¼189.counting was assessed positively in 68 percent observations
in elections until 2005 (n ¼ 17), and in 66 percent of obser-
vations in elections since 2005 (n¼ 21). On thewhole, these
ﬁgures do not mark a notable trend. The limited evidence
from the post-Soviet area does not provide support for the
arguments outlined above regarding whether electoral
malpractice is more prone to increase or decrease.
4. Electoral malpractice and type of elections
Is there a relation between the type of elections (pres-
idential or parliamentary) and the incidence of electoral
malpractice? The main reason to expect that presidential
elections will see higher levels of malpractice is thewinner-
takes-all character of these elections. While even a rela-
tively small vote share can win political forces some
representation in parliamentary elections, anything other
than a ﬁrst place means total defeat in presidential elec-
tions. This is particularly pertinent to the undemocratic
states of the post-Soviet area due to the weakness of
legislatures vis-à-vis the presidency in those states.
Formally, the political systems of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia (since 2004), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are semi-
presidential, meaning that there is a directly elected pres-
ident as well as a prime minister who is responsible to the
legislature. The only purely presidential system among the
undemocratic states of the region is that of Turkmenistan;
Moldova by contrast is home to a parliamentary system. Of
the three types of semi-presidentialism distinguished by
Elgie (2005) – highly presidentialized semi-presidential
regimes, semi-presidential regimes with a balance of
presidential and prime-ministerial powers, and semi-
presidential regimes with ceremonial presidents – nine
semi-presidential regimes in the post-Soviet area ﬁt the
highly presidentialized type, while a tenth, Kyrgyzstan, did
so until 2010. Most presidents in the region, whether
formally or by virtue of political practice, are even more
powerful, and certainly less accountable, than many pres-
idents in purely presidential regimes, a situation that has
been referred to as ‘superpresidentialism’ (Ishiyama &
Kennedy, 2001). Whereas the legislative and judicial
branches of power are formally separated, the executive in
these countries tends to assume control over all branches of
power, establishing a de facto monolithic political
arrangement. The presidency, therefore, is the biggest
political prize that can be won through elections, and
regimes may be expected to engage in more electoral
malpractice to ensure that the presidency is retained.
On the other hand, the incentive to engage in
malpractice in presidential electionsmay be smaller than in
parliamentary elections because the outcome generally is
a foregone conclusion: of the seventeen presidential elec-
tions in the dataset above, only onewas eventually not won
by the candidate who had been nominated by the incum-
bent regime – the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine
which led to the Orange Revolution. The authorities,
arguably, can get the outcome they seek even without
engaging in the costly effort of electoral corruption. In
parliamentary elections, on the other hand, it can be more
difﬁcult for the regime to achieve the outcome it seeks -
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electoral malpractice accordingly may be stronger.
With respect to the undemocratic states of the post-
Soviet area, however, the incidence of election-day elec-
toral malpractice is seemingly unrelated to the type of
elections: in parliamentary elections, voting procedures
were positively assessed by 88 percent of observers, and
counting procedures by 64 percent of observers. Analogous
ﬁgures for presidential elections are 87 percent and 66
percent.
5. Does less competition mean more fraud?
The ﬁnal relationship explored here is between electoral
malpractice and the presence of competition in elections.
Widely different and in part competing claims can be made
regarding this relationship. The results of hegemonic
elections by themselves may be seen as evidence of fraud:
the margins between winners and runner-ups that are
typical for hegemonic elections seem toowide to reﬂect the
will of voters. In clean, democratic elections it is difﬁcult to
imagine that the winning candidate would receive eighty-
seven percent of the vote against three percent for his
closest competitor, as was the case in the 2008 presidential
elections in Azerbaijan; or that not a single party beyond
the winning party would clear a seven percent threshold in
parliamentary elections, as happened in the 2007 parlia-
mentary elections in Kazakhstan. Research on electoral
fraud in Russia suggests that electionswith largemargins of
victory indeed are more fraudulent: regions in Russia with
the least competitive election results are associated with
higher levels of fraud (Shpilkin, 2009).
A second and related reason to believe that hegemonic
elections may feature a higher level of fraud is that a large
margin of victory in hegemonic elections in itself contains
beneﬁts for the regime. A big electoral win allows author-
itarian regimes ‘to project an image of invincibility and
strength’ (Magaloni, 2008, p. 729). The circumstance that
large-scale fraud is committed, often in a quite visible way,
can further reinforce this image: a regime that commits
fraud with impunity now is unlikely to be overturned in
next elections. The signal of strength can have beneﬁcial
effects for the regimes at different levels: it can convince
current regime insiders to stay loyal with the regime; it can
discourage the opposition from further engaging in oppo-
sition activity (Magaloni, 2006); and it is likely to lead to
lower turnout, especially among voters who are inclined to
vote for the opposition (Simpser, 2004). Because of these
beneﬁts, authoritarian regimes are thought to rig elections
even when they may not need to do so to win them.
The thesis that committing fraud with impunity
enhances the perceived strength of a regime can explain
why hegemonic regimes do fairly little to cover up much of
the fraud that they commit in elections (Hyde, 2006) and
why, as the previous section pointed out, electoral
malpractice does not signiﬁcantly decrease over time if it
decreases at all. The election observation reports of the
OSCE suggest indeed that comparatively obvious forms of
fraud such as ballot-stufﬁng, multiple voting, vote-buying,
and tampering with protocols are, as before, frequently
applied in the former Soviet Union.Still, the argument can be made that authoritarian
regimes are disinclined to engage in the potentially costly
act of committing fraud when they are likely to win elec-
tions by a large margin. This may be particularly so for
hegemonic authoritarian regimes that ﬁrmly control the
political playing ﬁeld and do not allow ameaningful degree
of competition in elections. The little political opposition
that exists under the hegemonic authoritarian regimes of
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan is
fragmented and hapless and in no situation to pose an
electoral threat to pro-presidential forces. Besides, the
leaders of the regimes may calculate that much of the
electorate that nourishes anti-regime sentiments is
unlikely to turn out in elections.
Finally, a reason why especially competitive authori-
tarian regimes have an incentive to refrain from extensive
and large-scale fraud on election day is the risk of post-
election protests. A signiﬁcant share of regime changes
inside and outside the post-Soviet area in recent decades
have transpired in the form of electoral revolutions (Bunce
& Wolchik, 2006). In these revolutions, the popular
perception that the regime has committed fraud in elec-
tions, or has even stolen elections, triggers mass protests
which eventually bring an end to the regime. Three such
revolutions in recent years in the post-Soviet area - in
Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in
2005 – gave rise to the belief that a new momentum for
democratization was under way, and made leaders in the
region aware of the risks that fraudulent elections entail.
The circumstance that the three revolutions happened to
competitive authoritarian regimes rather than to the
hegemonic authoritarian regimes was not by chance.
Among the ‘factors of success’ of the revolutions identiﬁed
by McFaul (2005, p. 7) were the presence of a relatively
strong oppositionmovement and some independentmedia
through which the opposition was able to spread its
message. These two elements are common under
competitive authoritarian regimes, while political opposi-
tion is weaker and the media environment more con-
strained, under hegemonic authoritarianism. Competitive
authoritarian regimes therefore seem especially at risk of
facing the type of protests that can lead to electoral revo-
lutions if they commit fraud. This poses a dilemma to
authoritarian regimes that organize competitive elections
as those elections by deﬁnition feature comparatively small
margins of victory, and committing some degree on fraud
on election daymay be necessary to ensure regime survival.
Regimes that organize hegemonic elections, by contrast,
rarely are confronted with popular protests that can
threaten the survival of the regime, and, as argued above,
the fact that (large-scale) fraud is committed in these
elections can even be seen as evidence of the strength of
the regime.
Taken together, there are more, and more compelling,
arguments which lead to expect that hegemonic elections
in the post-Soviet area feature a greater degree of electoral
malpractice than competitive elections do. These argu-
ments are supported by the evidence. In the hegemonic
elections of the data set (n¼ 24), voting procedureswere on
average positively assessed by 75 percent of observers
against 91 percent in competitive elections (n ¼ 15). An
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dures: observers saw a generally well-administered
counting process in 58 percent of observations in hege-
monic elections (n¼ 23), against 75 percent for competitive
elections (n ¼ 15). With respect to both voting procedures
and counting procedures, then, hegemonic elections
apparently are more tainted by electoral malpractice than
competitive elections. Thisﬁnding appears to lend credence
to the argument that regimes that organize hegemonic
elections aim for large victories by extralegal means.
6. Implications for election observation
OSCE’s election observation is part of a larger electoral
assistance effort that also comprises reviews of electoral
legislation. Ultimately, the electoral assistance by the OSCE
aims at contributing to an improvement of the quality of
elections in the countries that are subject to the assistance.
OSCE’s own data suggest that the quality of elections does
not improve in the states of the post-Soviet area that were
consistently undemocratic during the 2000s. This ﬁnding
can hardly be attributed to the growing pains of a political
transition towards democracy, as most regimes in the
region have been in place for a considerable time, and up to
two decades in some cases. Instead, the failure to organize
better-quality seems to point to a lack of political will on
the part of the regimes. This pertains in particular to the
regimes that organize elections without competition: this
study ﬁnds, in line with expectations, that hegemonic
authoritarian elections in the region feature signiﬁcantly
higher levels of malpractice than competitive authoritarian
elections.
Like any form of democracy assistance, electoral assis-
tance appears most appropriate in a context of democra-
tization: when political leaders in formerly authoritarian
states are genuinely committed to holding democratic
elections and consolidating democratic government, the
assistance can achieve its biggest impact. Election obser-
vation, however, has considerable merits even in undem-
ocratic contexts: it reinforces the norm of free and fair
elections, both in the country where the observation takes
place and among the countries that contribute to the effort;
it exposes large groups of people, including election ofﬁ-
cials, politicians, as well as ordinary citizens, to good
practice regarding free and fair elections, which may turn
out especially beneﬁcial in the case of a democratic
breakthrough; and, arguably, it helps to deter electoral
fraud where observers are on the ground.
Still, its lack of effect on the quality of elections may
prompt the OSCE to amend its policies regarding elections
observation. One natural way to do this would be to
expand the range of elections to which full observations
missions are not dispatched to elections that are orga-
nized by regimes which perpetually fail to improve the
quality of election procedures, routinely disregard OSCE
recommendations, and do not allow for a meaningful
degree of competition in elections. At the same time, the
OSCE could demonstrate its continued commitment to the
norm of free and fair elections by stepping up electoral
assistance to countries when a fresh momentum for
reform is noticeable.References
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